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A Proposed SEC Cyber Data Disclosure
Advisory Commission
By Lawrence J. Trautman and Neal F. Newman*
Introduction
Public disclosure isn’t new. We’ve been requiring disclosure of
important information from companies sincee Great Depression.
The basic bargain is this: investors get to decide what risks they
wish to take. Companies that are raising money from the public
have an obligation to share information with investors on a regular basis. Over the decades, there’s been debate about disclosure
on things that, today, we consider pretty essential for shareholders.
Today, investors increasingly want to understand the climate
risks of the companies whose stock they own or might buy. Large
and small investors, representing literally tens of trillions of dollars, are looking for this information to determine whether to
invest, sell, or make a voting decision one way or another.
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Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss;
data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company
intellectual property and sensitive customer information. Cyber
attacks disrupt the very ﬂow of reliable information and thought
in a democratic society, threatening free speech and other necessary Constitutional provisions and guarantees.2 To paraphrase
Lord Kelvin’s famous observation, “you can’t manage what you
don’t measure.”3 How then does the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) craft a disclosure regime that captures in a
structured data format all those measurable components of costs
that allows management and investors to better understand the
true costs incurred in cyber defense and breach mediation? This
inquiry logically dovetails into the broader question of externality
costs associated with cyberattack that, when ignored by industry,
are placed as additional burdens upon government and other
institutions (such as municipalities, school systems and universities) and consumers when their identity data is stolen and fraud
subsequently committed against them. SEC chair Gary Gensler
states, “The economic cost of cyberattacks is estimated to be at
least in the billions, and possibly in the trillions, of dollars. Hackers have attacked broker-dealers, governmental agencies, meat
processors, and pipelines. These attacks can take many forms
from denials-of-service to malware to ransomware.”4 By now, a
broad understanding of the pervasive threat of cyberattack from
international criminal organizations, nation states, and even
poorly capitalized criminal elements are legion.5 We will not
replicate that discussion here, except to brieﬂy mention several
recent attacks to illustrate some of the difﬁculties and challenges
in capturing accurate aggregate cost data. We commend the SEC
for their March 2022 issuance of a proposed rule addressing
Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and
Incident Disclosure,6 to require:
1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents;
2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and
procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks;
3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies
and procedures;
4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its
oversight of cybersecurity risk;
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5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported
cybersecurity incidents in their periodic reports; and
6. Cybersecurity disclosures to be presented in Inline extensible
Business Reporting Language (“Inline XBRL”).7
This paper was submitted as a recommendation in response to
the SEC’s request for comment to the proposed Rule and submitted on May 9, 2022.8

Proposed Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission
In the following pages we recommend that the SEC build upon
the March 2022 proposed rule by creating a Cyber Data Disclosure
Advisory Commission to be comprised of relevant stakeholder
groups to investigate and promulgate suggestions for a standardized disclosure regime for cyber data. Our task of creating a
template that will deﬁne and capture those measurable costs
that are necessarily required for a meaningful analysis is
multifaceted. Just a few of the many complex issues include:
1. What cybersecurity disclosure information is useful to investors?;
2. What investments in cyber defense are period costs?;
3. Which costs should appropriately be capitalized such as secondary data recovery centers (if any) and amortized over
what period of time (for reporting purposes)?;
4. How do we measure known losses?
5. Which imputed costs (if any), such as lost sales, are appropriate for inclusion in our measurement?
6. Can agreement be reached about how reputational costs associated with cyber breaches should be measured (imputed)?
Our paper proceeds in seven parts. First, we provide a brief
discussion about the difﬁcult challenges associated with capturing cyber threat data. Second, is a brief history of the SEC
disclosure regime. Third, we address the economics of
cybersecurity. Fourth, we provide a proposed schematic for composition and workﬂow for an SEC Cyber Data Disclosure
Commission. Fifth, we highlight the important implications of
this study for the preservation of U.S. national security interests.
The American business community is a critical link in the
national cyber security equation. Any weak link in the system
constitutes an unacceptable vulnerability for all citizens. Sixth,
we recommend the Commission consider asking Congress to pass
legislation creating a Public Company Cybersecurity Oversight
Board for publicly-traded companies similar to the PCAOB. And
last, we conclude. We believe this proposal is signiﬁcant and
represents a timely contribution in fostering better cooperation
between all interested stakeholders in cyber hygiene and security.
© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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I. CHALLENGES OF CAPTURING CYBER THREAT
DATA
The SEC’s March 2022 issuance of a proposed rule addressing
Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and
Incident Disclosure states, “where possible, we have attempted to
quantify the beneﬁts, costs, and effects on efﬁciency, competition,
and capital formation expected to result from the proposed
amendments. In many cases, however, we are unable to quantify
the potential economic effects.”9 Herein lies the problem and the
basis for the contribution made by this paper. The SEC acknowledges that:
[W]e lack information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate.
Where we are unable to quantify the economic effects of the
proposed amendments, we provide a qualitative assessment of the
potential effects and encourage commenters to provide data and information that would help quantify the beneﬁts, costs, and the
potential impacts of the proposed amendments on efﬁciency, competition, and capital formation.10

Not only do regulators need this granular information to
formulate effective policy, but management, directors, and investors need structured data presented in a meaningful and comparable format to facilitate decisions about this critically important
issue. This proposal presents a schematic to achieve just that.
Many Successful Inﬁltrations Undetected
By now, it is likely that essentially all organizations possessing
valuable information have been successfully penetrated by
outside entities. In many cases the data architecture of breached
entities has successfully been explored and mapped. Former
National Security Agency (NSA) director of research Frederick R.
Chang has observed, “generally, there are two only types of
companies: those that know they have been breached, and those
that don’t know they have been breached.”11
Externalities Abound
Examples of cyber breaches abound of situations presenting
difﬁcult-to-deﬁne aggregate cost scenarios. For example, when an
airline experiences a data breach that results in ﬂight cancellations, the airline knows how many ﬂights have been cancelled,
passengers rebooked on their later ﬂights, and revenue lost forever when passengers take other carriers. Economists would also
suggest that impacted passengers, as a result, likely incur costs
associated with missed connections, absences from important
meetings, unreimbursed unexpected lodging and meal expenses,
loss of productive time, etc. Customer loyalty is a very valuable
asset to an airline. Should data breaches happen more than once,
passengers may change their afﬁliation loyalty.
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In the case of data breaches resulting in the loss of personally
identiﬁable information (PII) such as the Target breach during
2013,12 Mariott (2019),13 or Yahoo (2013),14 all these companies
incurred costs resulting from these breaches. However, many of
their customers also incurred unreimbursed expenses as a direct
result of these breaches, if only in terms of the lost time and
expense associated with mitigating adverse credit reporting
events. Congress has recently conducted multiple hearings aimed
at understanding the adverse impact of nation state supported
actors in fraudulently hijacking social media platforms for use as
propaganda proxies.15 We suggest that this is not without serious
costs to our society.
History of Poor Cyber Threat Information
Our history of failed cyber risk management is punctuated
with poor information security cost data. Professor Tyler Moore
points to the misaligned enterprise incentives that are pervasive
in our experience. Consider how, “Information systems are prone
to fail when the person or ﬁrm responsible for protecting the
system is not the one who suffers when it fails. Unfortunately, in
many circumstances online risks are allocated poorly.”16 For
example, Professor Moore states:
There is an incentive to under-report incidents across the board.
Banks do not want to reveal fraud losses for fear of frightening
away customers from online banking; businesses do not want to cooperate with the police on cyber-espionage incidents because their
reputation (and their stock price) may take a hit; operators of critical infrastructures do not want to reveal information on outages
caused by malicious attack for fear it would draw attention to
systemic vulnerabilities. The reticence to share information is only
countered by the over-enthusiasm of many in the IT security
industry to hype threats.17

Consider that, “Systems often fail because the organizations
that defend them do not bear the full costs of failure.”18 Your
authors contend that a necessary very ﬁrst step in achieving
national cybersecurity for all interested stakeholders is to devise
a template for the analysis and better understanding of actual
costs. In the absence of widespread understanding, no useful
cost-beneﬁt analysis can be conducted with subsequent mitigation of risk.
Deﬁnitions
We remain indebted to the Commission for deﬁning the terms
“cybersecurity incident,” “cybersecurity threat,” and “information
systems” in their proposed rule announced during March 2022.19
Accordingly, propose Item 106 and proposed Form 8-K Item 1.05
provide that:
E Cybersecurity incident means an unauthorized occurrence on
© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022

203

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL
or conducted through a registrant’s information systems
that jeopardizes the conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability
of a registrant’s information systems or any information
residing therein;
E Cybersecurity threat means any potential occurrence that
may result in, an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the
conﬁdentiality, integrity or availability of a registrant’s information systems or any information residing therein.
E Information systems means the information resources, owned
or used by the registrant, including physical or virtual
infrastructure controlled by such information resources, or
components thereof, organized for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of
the registrant’s information to maintain or support the
registrant’s operations.
What constitutes a “cybersecurity incident” for purposes of
our proposal should be construed broadly and may result
from any one or more of the following: an accidental exposure
of data, a deliberate action or activity to gain unauthorized
access to systems or to steal or alter data, or other system
compromises or data breaches.20
II. THE SEC DISCLOSURE REGIME
“Innovation doesn’t come just from updating software and hardware;
it also comes from the manner in which products are offered . . . Beyond the innovations and technologies, our economy is changing in
other ways. Today, investors are demanding additional information
from companies beyond what they’ve sought historically, with respect to climate risk, human capital, and cybersecurity risk . . .
Again, ‘no regulation can be static in a dynamic society.’ ’’

Gary Gensler
Chair
U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission
January 19, 202221
Disclosure of material items is at the very cornerstone of U.S.
capital formation and securities regulation. SEC Chair Gary
Gensler states, “We have a key role as the regulator of the capital
markets with regard to SEC registrants — ranging from exchanges and brokers to advisers and public issuers. Cyber relates
to each part of our three-part mission, and in particular to our
goal of maintaining orderly markets.”22 In addition, the Commission has, “many rules that implicate cyber risk, including but not
limited to business continuity, books and records, compliance,
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© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022

[VOL. 50:3 2022] PROPOSED SEC CYBER DATA DISCLOSURE
disclosure, market access, and antifraud. Our Division of
Examinations (EXAMS) has put out various Risk Alerts and
statements regarding cybersecurity topics and issued a report in
2020 on Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations.”23 Chairman
Gensler states that the work of the Commission assists both SEC
registrants and the public in preparation for and management of
these cyber risks.24
History
In Professor Newman’s co-authored Article with Professor
Lawrence Trautman, he outlines the historical underpinnings of
the current US disclosure regime for publicly traded companies.25
In that writing, Professor Newman notes that the current
disclosure regime governing the buying and selling of securities
was spawned during the early part of the 1900’s. Recall the great
depression and the collapse in the stock market that occurred in
1929.26 From these events, government recognized that a more
formal process needed to be put in place regarding the buying
and selling of ownership in companies. The history surrounding
the ﬁrst federal securities law act is a storied one. In fact, it took
two attempts before congress had an act it was willing to move
forward with.27
The ﬁrst attempt failed due to the initial act’s ideological focus.
Instead of the informed disclosure regime that we now have, the
ﬁrst attempt was based off of what is referred to as “merit
regulation.” Merit regulation is an approach that would require
regulators in essence to pick stock winners and losers; a speculative endeavor at best and one fraught with what are now clear
problematic pitfalls that would result if the government was in
the business of deciding which stocks may be worthy and which
stocks may be unworthy for public consumption.28
Regarding the second attempt. “Harvard law professor (and
future Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter was called in to
develop a revised bill. Frankfurter’s team including James
Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Tommy Corcoran drafted a bill following the British securities law approach, based primarily on
full disclosure of material information leaving it to investors
rather than the government to judge the merits of any stock
offer.”29 For political reasons, Frankfurter’s team decided to start
with the failed ﬁrst draft to use as the basis for drafting the piece
of legislation that has stood the test of time and is substantively
the same document that was drafted some 88 years ago. As the
story is told, Frankfurter’s team penned the Securities Act of
1933 over a weekend. To this day, scholars still marvel at the ‘33
Act’s idiosyncratic nature. The Act has been described as “a masterpiece,”30 “a writing with interwoven complexities and neatly
hidden traps,,31 “an intellectual Tour de Force,”32 “a complex
© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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mental game derived by three exceptional minds.”33 The authors
can attest that the Act is unique in the way it is constructed; it is
all that it is referred to and more.
Although the ‘33 Act as penned back in the early 1930’s, is
idiosyncratic and complex in its drafting, the ‘33 Act’s underlying
premise is a simple one: that investors receive full and fair
ﬁnancial disclosure when companies initially issue stock to
investors. Likewise, the Exchange Act of 1934 steps in where the
‘33 Act leaves off and requires full and fair disclosure of publicly
traded companies on a periodic and ongoing basis. The idea being, that investors will have access to company information that
is readily available for use in making investment decisions.
Much has been written over the years documenting the many
spectacular failures in corporate governance34 and recommending
steps to be taken for improvement.35 We will not attempt to
replicate these here.
Sommer 1977 SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure
A.A. “Al” Sommer served a three-year term as SEC Commissioner during the 1970s, and thereafter was Chair “for 13 years
of the Public Oversight Board, created by the American Institute
of Certiﬁed Public Accountants to help monitor accounting ﬁrms
that audit public corporations.”36 As Chair of the SEC’s 1977 Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, attorney and professor Sommer stated, “Very simply put . . . if every instance of
adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less
adultery.”37 In explaining the Advisory Committee’s report, Chairman Sommer stated:
[T]he Committee recognized that in any society needs and demands
will exceed available resources. When that is the case, as it
universally is, it is necessary that the scarce resources be allocated.
It is axiomatic that such allocation will be best achieved if those
involved in allocation decisions have the beneﬁt of reliable, timely
and sufﬁcient information. Thus, in making investment decisions,
investors are likeliest to make efﬁcient allocations of resources if
they have available information with those characteristics.38

Whether they like it or not, recognize it or not, many parties
having various roles in the capital formation process (brokers,
dealers, corporate management and board directors, investment
bankers, venture capitalists, external auditors, and software and
data service providers) are unwillingly drawn into the common
ﬁght to ensure cybersecurity. The corporate governance literature
is full of articles having a focus on privacy39 and cyber risk.40 SEC
Commissioner Paredes states:
By ensuring that investors have the information they need to make
informed decisions, mandatory disclosure, in turn, leverages market discipline as a means of accountability that obviates the need
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for more substantive government regulation of securities-related
activities. Through their investment decisions, investors are able to
bring pressure to bear on directors, ofﬁcers, investment advisers,
broker-dealers, and other market participants to serve investor
interests. Market participants are incentivized to satisfy investor
demands because investors “reward” and “punish” by how and with
whom they choose to invest and transact . . . as a regulatory mechanism, disclosure privileges investor choice, favors private ordering
over one-size-ﬁts-all mandates, and encourages innovation and
competition.41

Climate and ESG Task Force Announced
Demonstrating the recent focus and priority of Environmental,
Social, and Governance (ESG), on March 4, 2021 the SEC announced the creation of a Climate and ESG Task Force within
the Division of Enforcement.42 Led by Acting Division of Enforcement Deputy Director Kelly L. Gibson, the new task force is “a
Division-wide effort, with 22 members drawn from the SEC’s
headquarters, regional ofﬁces, and Enforcement specialized
units.”43 The Commission states:
Consistent with increasing investor focus and reliance on climate
and ESG-related disclosure and investment, the Climate and ESG
Task Force will develop initiatives to proactively identify ESGrelated misconduct. The task force will also coordinate the effective
use of Division resources, including through the use of sophisticated data analysis to mine and assess information across registrants, to identify potential violations.
The initial focus will be to identify any material gaps or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules.
The task force will also analyze disclosure and compliance issues
relating to investment advisers’ and funds’ ESG strategies. Its work
will complement the agency’s other initiatives in this area, including the recent appointment of Satyam Khanna as a Senior Policy
Advisor for Climate and ESG. As an integral component of the
agency’s efforts to address these risks to investors, the task force
will work closely with other SEC Divisions and Ofﬁces, including
the Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management,
and Examinations. “Climate risks and sustainability are critical issues for the investing public and our capital markets,” said Acting
Chair Allison Herren Lee.44

Laws and regulations are constantly in a race to keep up with
rapidly changing technological developments.45 For example, during mid-February 2022, The Wall Street Journal reported,
“federal regulators are closing in on rules requiring all public
companies to disclose their greenhouse-gas output. But they are
struggling to ﬁgure out how much detail to demand about emissions produced by businesses’ suppliers and customers.”46 According to ﬁnancial market journalists, it appears that, “SEC ofﬁcials
drawing up the landmark rules face a balancing act. Many inves© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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tors are demanding the information so they can judge the risks
faced by companies from climate change and regulations designed
to mitigate it.”47 Just like climate issues, the governance of
cybersecurity can now be recognized as an integral part of ESG—the “governance” part.48
Increased Importance of Cyber Recognized by SEC
Continued recognition of the increased role of cyber security in
corporate risk management is observed by the SEC’s announcement on May 3, 2022, of “the allocation of 20 additional positions
to the unit responsible for protecting investors in crypto markets
and from cyber-related threats. [This] newly renamed Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit (formerly known as the Cyber Unit) in the
Division of Enforcement will grow to 50 dedicated positions.”49
The SEC states:
Since its creation in 2017, the unit has brought more than 80
enforcement actions related to fraudulent and unregistered crypto
asset offerings and platforms, resulting in monetary relief totaling
more than $2 billion. The expanded crypto assets and Cyber Unit
will leverage the agency’s expertise to ensure investors are
protected in the crypto markets, with a focus on investigating securities law violations related to:
E Crypto asset offerings;
E Crypto asset exchanges;
E Crypto asset lending and staking products;
E Decentralized ﬁnance (“DeFi”) platforms;
E Non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”); and
E Stablecoins.
In addition, the unit has brought numerous actions against SEC
registrants and public companies for failing to maintain adequate
cybersecurity controls and for failing to appropriately disclose cyberrelated risks and incidents. The Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit will
continue to tackle the omnipresent cyber-related threats to the
nation’s markets. ‘Crypto markets have exploded in recent years,
with retail investors bearing the brunt of abuses in this space.
Meanwhile, cyber-related threats continue to pose existential risks
to our ﬁnancial markets and participants,’ said Gurbir S. Grewal,
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.50

History of Electronic Disclosure: The EDGAR Releases
Development of an electronic disclosure system began in 1983,
with a pilot system opened during fall 1984 for volunteer ﬁlings
with both the Division of Investment Management and Division
of Corporation Finance.51 “An evaluation of these ﬁlings was
conducted by the staff between January 1 and June 30, 1994,
resulting in a positive assessment of the EDGAR system.”52 The
Commission by early 1993 began to require, “electronic ﬁlings
through it’s Electronic Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system,
208
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EDGAR. This system is intended to beneﬁt electronic ﬁlers,
enhance the speed and efﬁciency of SEC processing, and make
corporate and ﬁnancial information available to investors, the
ﬁnancial community and others in a manner of minutes.”53 In
sum, the Commission recognized that, “Electronic dissemination
generates more informed investor participation and more
informed securities markets.”54 The EDGAR ﬁling system now
“requires that ofﬁcial documents—attached to electronically
submitted ﬁlings—be formatted as one of the following; HTML,
American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII),
or, whenever speciﬁc criteria are met, Portable Document Format
(PDF).”55
Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)
Now used worldwide by ﬁnancial regulatory agencies, in recognition of the need for structured automated data analysis, during
2009 the SEC ﬁrst required issuer submission of data in
Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) format; “in a
separate XML ﬁle or more recently embedded in quarterly and
annual HTML reports as inline XBRL . . . [these] facts must be
associated for a standard US-GAAP or IFRS taxonomy. Companies can also extend standard taxonomies with their own custom
taxonomies.”56 The ﬁler submission histories and XBRL ﬁnancial
statement data currently included in Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) currently include forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 40-F,
20-F, 6-K and their variants.57 Incorporation of this structured
data schematic, “ensures that facts have a consistent context and
meaning across companies and between ﬁlings and are comparable between companies and across time.”58 The SEC’s Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident
Disclosure proposed rule announced during March 2022 provides
that registrants be required:
[T]o tag information speciﬁed by Item 1.05 of Form 8-K and Items
1.06 and 407(j) of Regulation S-K in Inline XBRL in accordance
with Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (17 CFR 232.405) and the EDGAR
Filer Manual. The proposed requirements would include block text
tagging of narrative disclosures, as well as detail tagging of
Quantitative amounts disclosed within the narrative disclosures.
Inline XBRL is both machine-readable and human-readable, which
improves the quality and usability of XBRL data for investors.
Requiring Inline XBRL tagging of the disclosures provided pursuant to these disclosure items would beneﬁt investors by making the
disclosures more readily available and easily accessible to investors, market participants, and others for aggregation, comparison,
ﬁltering, and other analysis, as compared to requiring a nonmachine readable data language such as ASCII or HTML. This
Inline XBRL tagging would enable automated extraction and analysis of the granular data required by the proposed rules, allowing
© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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investors and other market participants to more efﬁciently perform
large-scale analysis and comparison of this information across
registrants and time periods. For narrative disclosures, an Inline
XBRL requirement would allow investors to extract and search for
disclosures about cybersecurity incidents reported on Form 8-K,
updated information about cybersecurity incidents reported in a
registrant’s periodic reports, a registrant’s cybersecurity policies
and procedures, management’s role in assessing and managing
cybersecurity risks, and the board of directors’ oversight of
cybersecurity risk and cybersecurity expertise rather than having
to manually run searches for these disclosures through entire
documents. The Inline XBRL requirement would also enable
automatic comparison of these disclosures against prior periods,
and targeted artiﬁcial intelligence/machine learning assessments of
speciﬁc narrative disclosures rather than the entire unstructured
document. At the same time, we do not expect the incremental
compliance burden associated with tagging the proposed additional
information to be unduly burdensome because registrants subject to
the proposed tagging requirements are for the most part subject to
similar Inline XBRL requirements in other Commission ﬁlings.59

Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Reg SCI)
Speaking during January 2022, SEC Chair Gary Gensler
states, “I believe we have an opportunity to freshen up Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Reg SCI).60 Adopted during 2014, Reg SCI “covers a subset of large registrants, including
stock exchanges, clearinghouses, alternative trading systems,
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and the like — ﬁnancial
infrastructure that is part of the backbone of the capital
markets.”61 In addition, “The Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT), as a
facility of each of the participant SROs, also is subject to Reg
SCI.”62 Chairman Gensler adds:
The rule helps ensure these large, important entities have sound
technology programs, business continuity plans, testing protocols,
data backups, and so on. The core goal of Reg SCI was to reduce
the occurrence of systems issues and improve resiliency when they
do occur.
A lot has changed, though, in the eight years since the SEC
adopted Reg SCI. Thus, I’ve asked staff how we might broaden and
deepen this rule. For example, might we consider applying Reg SCI
to other large, signiﬁcant entities it doesn’t currently cover, such as
the largest market-makers and broker-dealers? To that end, in
2020, the Commission proposed to bring large Treasury trading
platforms under the SCI umbrella. At our next Commission meeting, we will consider whether to re-propose this rule. Similarly, I
think there might be opportunities to deepen Reg SCI to further
shore up the cyber hygiene of important ﬁnancial entities.63

Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and
Incident Disclosure
The SEC’s March 2022 issuance of a proposed rule addressing
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Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and
Incident Disclosure has resulted in both substantial comments
received by the Commission,64 and coverage and commentary in
the ﬁnancial press.65 Examples of information useful to investors,
and all other stakeholders including those who are responsible
for securing America’s national security, is described by The Wall
Street Journal when they write, “Under proposals from the SEC,
the agency expects to know more about how listed companies
manage cyber risk. Businesses would be required to disclose
which board directors have cybersecurity expertise, how often the
topic of cybersecurity is discussed and what, if any, oversight the
board has over cyber matters.”66 Outside the SEC:
Others say [the proposed rule] provides much needed clarity on
expectations from watchdogs, as cybersecurity has become a core
business risk for companies.
‘I think it’s a reset, and I think the advantage of this reset is they
are being very clear. They’re telling you what they expect,’ said
Cyrus Vance Jr., partner and global chair of law ﬁrm Baker
McKenzie LLP’s cybersecurity practice. In practice, security chiefs
say, this means that chief information security ofﬁcers and others
with cyber responsibilities must learn how to translate cybersecurity
data into clear risk information that nontechnical board directors
can quickly understand.
This may force some companies to rethink the role itself, said
Shaun Marion, CISO at fast-food chain McDonald’s Corp. He said
when he landed his ﬁrst cybersecurity executive position in 2011,
he lacked experience interacting with a corporate board and didn’t
get much help. ‘My ﬁrst board meeting was sink or swim,’ he said.
‘I wouldn’t say I swam.’
The SEC’s call for senior leaders and directors to understand and
disclose more about their company’s cyber-security posture will
require a strong relationship between the CISO and the board, he
said. ‘It will change how we develop the next generation of CISOs,’
he said, relying less on technical knowledge and more on businessrisk experience . . .
Installing directors with cybersecurity expertise can help the rest
of the board grasp these issues, said Baker McKenzie’s Mr. Vance.67

University of Texas law professor Henry T.C. Hu served as the
founding Director of the SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial innovation from 2009–2011 (now renamed Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis). Professor Hu observes that:
Since the depression, the federal government’s totemic philosophy
as to markets and corporations has been to help ensure a robust informational foundation for private decision makers. The rationale
was that a disclosure regime center posted by the U. S. Securities
and Exchange Commission would contribute to informed choices by
market participants, furthering efﬁciency both in the paper
economy and in the real economy. Moreover, this informational
foundation would enhance corporate governance. Managements
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would be deterred from behavior unsustainable in the light of day,
and the monitoring and disciplining of managements by shareholders, as well as the market for corporate control, would be facilitated
. . .
[T]his philosophy was also decidedly incrementalist. The SEC
would not venture beyond the realm of information to that of
substantive decision making. In the paper economy, the nature and
characteristics of the securities offered, the relationships between
underwriters and issuers, and the securities’ offering and trading
prices were left to participants and overall market forces. In the
real economy, corporate managements would generally be left to
make their own decisions as to the deployment of resources, including in the critical area of risk taking. This philosophy stemmed . . .
from Louis Brandeis’s deep-seated, compellingly expressed belief in
the power?and sufﬁciency?of bringing sunlight to markets.68

Professor Hu contends that the SEC’s “disclosure philosophy
and its longstanding implementation methodology . . . are at the
brink of metamorphosis . . . A new implementation methodology,
rooted in a more comprehensive conception of information and
facilitated by innovations in computer and Internet technologies,
could help address such disclosure challenges.” 69 Now, approximately 90 years following creation of the SEC, it seems
clear that the “disclosure paradigm emerged in a simpler time,
relied on a simple conception of information and implementation
strategy, and was directed at simple goals. The modern process of
ﬁnancial innovation . . . [is] far more complex than in the past.”70
Professor Hu writes:
[I]n order to meet the disclosure and other regulatory challenges
posed by ﬁnancial innovation, it is essential that there not only be
enough talented traditional lawyers at the SEC, but that there also
be enough talented personnel with other skills and backgrounds. A
vigorously interdisciplinary approach, enhanced by ‘local knowledge’ of market realities, is essential to the formulation of public
policy in respect of modern capital markets . . .
To remain vital, the SEC disclosure paradigm must be able to
encompass in a meaningful and systematic way the vast complexities of modern markets and institutions. A fundamental and
comprehensive rethinking is essential.71

III.

THE ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY

Rapidly Changing Technological Advances
The challenge of regulating cyber security is hampered by the
constantly expanding development of new and disruptive
technologies. For example, in just a little over a decade, development of blockchain-based technologies has created many new
challenges for the SEC. Multinational criminal organizations
have used virtual currencies to pay for the fruits of illegal items
and activities. Regulators struggle to understand and craft new
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schematics to regulate: virtual currencies, distributive autonomous organizations (the “DAO”), and non-fungible tokens (NFTs),
just to name a few. Just around the corner may be novel challenges to securities regulation presented by “deep fake” technology where, “Technologies for altering images, video, or audio (or
even creating them from scratch) in ways that are highly-realistic
and difﬁcult to detect are maturing rapidly . . . and [will] generate signiﬁcant policy and legal challenges.”72 Disruption to the
U.S. securities regulation process may also result from advances
in Quantum Computing developments.73
Professors Bushman and Smith discuss “the classic agency
perspective that the separation of corporate managers from
outside investors involves an inherent conﬂict. Corporate control
mechanisms are the means by which managers are disciplined to
act in the investors’ interest.”74 Accordingly, outside investors are
protected from expropriation by corporate insiders by “control
mechanisms [that] include both internal mechanisms, such as
managerial incentive plans, direct monitoring, and the internal
labor market, and external mechanisms, such as outside shareholder or debtholder monitoring, the market for corporate control,
competition in the product market, the external managerial labor
market, and securities laws.”75 Elsewhere, Professor William J.
Magnuson proposes a “Uniﬁed Theory of Data,” to “set forth
harmonized and consistent rules for the gathering, storage, and
use of data, and [to] establish rules to incentivize beneﬁcial data
practices and sanction harmful ones.”76 We believe this proposal
deserves serious consideration; but, further comment here is beyond the scope of these remarks.
Role of Corporate Directors in Cybersecurity Governance
It is a duty and responsibility of corporate directors to govern
cybersecurity and cyber risk.77 Publicly traded corporations have
a duty to disclose the existence of a data breach based upon at
least two distinct authorities: Delaware common law and the
SEC’s 2011 corporate ﬁnance disclosure guidance, which identiﬁes material data security risks that companies must disclose
under securities law disclosure requirements and accounting
standards.78 Accordingly, companies that know about a data
breach but fail to disclose it to shareholders, regulators, and
consumers, risk potential liability under corporate, breach
notiﬁcation, and securities laws.
Well established in Delaware common law is the concept that
directors’ and ofﬁcers’ of a corporation have a ﬁduciary duty to
shareholders and the corporation of disclosure—sometimes
referred to as a duty of complete candor.79 Many years ago, Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh noted that Delaware courts have
recognized “that a ﬁduciary duty to disclose all material informa© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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tion arises when directors approve any public statement, such as
a press release, regardless of whether any speciﬁc stockholder action is sought.”80
As early as January 2017, the World Economic Forum in collaboration with The Boston Consulting Group and Hewlett
Packard Enterprise issued their Future of Digital Economy and
Society System Initiative titled, “Advancing Cyber Resilience:
Principles and Tools for Boards.”81 Accordingly, the World Economic Forum writes:
Countering cyber risk presents a signiﬁcant strategic challenge to
leaders across industries and sectors but one that they must
surmount in order to take advantage of the opportunities presented
by the vast technological advances in networked technology that
are currently in their early stages. Over the past decade, we have
signiﬁcantly expanded our understanding of how to build secure
and resilient digital networks and connected devices. However,
board-level capabilities for strategic thinking and governance in
this area have failed to keep pace with both the technological risks
and the solutions that new innovations provide.82

Professor and former National Security Agency (NSA) Director of
Research Frederick R. Chang warns:
Basically, what directors need to know about cyber is that it is a
strategic risk and not just an IT thing. It’s easy to think of it as if,
there are some routers or some switches or some ﬁrewalls that get
broken, resulting in exposed data—- creating a problem. It’s
important to step back and reﬂect upon how cyber is a risk, like
any other risk. It can be thought of like an earthquake, or a ﬂood or
a ﬁre. Much like an earthquake, ﬂood or ﬁre — you can’t do
anything about it if there’s going to be an earthquake and you are
located in California. You can’t stop the earthquake. All too often, it
seems, there is a perception that cyber threat can actually be
stopped. It can’t be stopped. If a persistent attacker has a really
high desire to break through, then they’re going to get through. You
can’t stop them—- and cyber has to be viewed as a risk, like any
other risk . . . there are some things you can do to mitigate it the
risk, but you can’t eliminate the risk Maybe you can buy insurance,
you can bring in some more people to work on cybersecurity, and so
forth. But cyber threat is fundamentally something you can’t stop
and it needs to be viewed at that level. So; what steps does a board
take to have enough intrinsic knowledge about cyber? The task can
be a highly technical thing, but it isn’t only a technical concern.83

About two decades ago Professors Bushman and Smith crafted
a very useful schematic illustrating: “three channels through
which ﬁnancial accounting information may affect economic performance [observing] Governance role of ﬁnancial accounting information operates through channel 2” (Figure 1);84 and “predicted
interactions between ﬁnancial accounting regimes and other factors in affecting economic performance” (Figure 2).85 We have
included these useﬁl diagrams as an Appendix to this document.
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The Allocation of Costs
The allocation of costs incurred in cybersecurity efforts is far
from a straightforward task. While cybersecurity expenses paid
for cyber insurance, or to a consulting ﬁrm may seem easy to
identify, what portion of corporate information technology expenses should rightfully be included in this calculation? What criteria
should be agreed upon so that resulting measurements are comparable across industries? What portion of a secondary data
backup facility should be attributed, if any, to cyber risk management?
Professors Wolff and Lehr write that an estimate of total costs
for any given data breach incident must, “consider the costs
incurred by all market participants, which includes both the parties directly involved, as well as the costs that spillover onto
other market participants.”86 In addition:
Some of the costs to victims show up as revenues to InfoSec and
[cyber insurance] providers, while the payoffs of cyber insurance
claims received by victims help offset the costs born by victims . . .
the costs that InfoSec and [cyber insurance] providers incur in
developing and providing their services . . . should be included in
the calculus of the total costs of cybercrime.87

Direct and Indirect Corporate Costs
Identiﬁcation of those direct costs to be included in the
computation of cyber expense is a task appropriately assigned to
the accounting profession for discussion and determination. While
some direct costs will be easily identiﬁable such as: regulatory
compliance costs; ﬁnes and settlements; ransomware demands
paid; lost business attributable to cyber loss—- others will likely
best be identiﬁable with the beneﬁt of audit experience. Professors Wolff and Lehr observe that, “it is much easier to estimate
and observe direct costs than indirect costs. However, to estimate
total costs, we need to estimate both categories of costs, and
because indirect costs may be much larger, this poses a signiﬁcant enduring challenge for estimates of the total economic
impact of cybercrime.”88 Consider:
Direct costs are those that are directly attributable to a particular
cause and may be assigned to an identiﬁable agent who bears the
cost. A ﬁrm that suffers a data breach that entails the theft of PII
data for its customers may need to suspend its on-line eCommerce
operations while it is responding to or recovering from an attack.
The lost sales associated with the business interruption may be
relatively easy to estimate. Similarly, the expenditures by the
victim ﬁrm for InfoSec and CyberIns services and products that are
used in detection, prevention, and remediation, including for forensic analysis, system repairs or replacement, notifying customers
whose [personally identiﬁable information] [PII] has been breached
and providing them with credit monitoring services, and/or in pay© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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ing legal ﬁnes or settlements are direct costs that victim ﬁrms
incur. Losses attributable to fraud perpetrated with the stolen PII
are another source of direct cost incurred by the individuals whose
PII was breached.
Indirect costs include those that are produced as secondary effects of the incident, or that spillover to others that are not directly
involved in the incident. For the victims that are directly involved,
the loss of brand reputation or competitive advantage that may
adversely impact future sales is a potentially important source of
indirect costs from cybercrime. Additionally, the loss of market
trust that may slow market growth or increase opportunity costs
for all market participants, or the increased likelihood of copycat
attacks on other victims are examples of the indirect cost of
cybercrime.89

Externalities
Professor Tyler Moore has warned that, “The [Information
Technology] IT industry is characterized by many different types
of externalities where individuals’ actions have side effects on
others.”90 Professor and seasoned corporate director Trautman
recalls a conversation that has been heard in many boardrooms,
and it goes like this, “even if we spend every dollar we could borrow . . . We still wouldn’t have spent enough on cyber. The North
Koreans, Russians, Chinese . . . all these nations are engaged in
cyber war. We don’t have enough money around here to ﬁght a
war . . . That’s what governments are for . . .”91 This pervasive
belief results in many boards just pushing the problem off on the
government, on others, on their customers and there are few
prosecutions, because cyber failures are so pervasive . . . because
every corporation has the same problem. Professor Moore states
that, “free-riding is likely whenever security depends on the
weakest link in the chain: ﬁrms do not bother investing in security when they know that other players will not invest, leaving
them vulnerable in any case.”92 What externality costs, if any,
should be standardized for inclusion by an issuer?
The Impact and Cost of Cyber Crime
Cyber crime takes many forms and continues to evolve in its
sophistication. Data breach involving the loss of customer
Personal Identiﬁable Information (PII) remains an expensive
proposition for many businesses. During recent years, malware
and ransomware has often resulted in substantial expense.93 The
theft of intellectual property remains both discovered and
undiscovered by many enterprises. From a public policy standpoint to what extent should intellectual property theft require
disclosure and, if disclosable, how measured and should it be
amortized, and if so, over what period or time, and by what
method?
In their excellent paper to be presented during June 2022,
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Professors Anderson, Barton, Böhme, Clayton, Gañán, Grasso,
Levi, Moore, and Vasek discuss “Measuring the Changing Cost of
Cybercrime.”94 Observing that “Measurement is not straightforward, as cybercrimes frequently cross jurisdictions, and the available statistics are fragmentary,”95 the authors:
[F]ollow the European Commission’s 2007 Communication “Towards
a general policy on the ﬁght against cyber crime”, which proposed a
threefold deﬁnition:
1. traditional forms of crime such as fraud or forgery, though
committed over electronic communication networks and information systems;
2. the publication of illegal content over electronic media (e.g.,
child sexual abuse material or incitement to racial hatred);
3. crimes unique to electronic networks, e.g., attacks against
information systems, denial of service and hacking.
To have a yardstick with which to measure changes, we break
down fraud ﬁgures as follows. We split direct costs from indirect
costs, accounting for the costs of security (which often cannot be allocated to speciﬁc crime types) and for the social and opportunity
costs of reduced trust in online transactions. Where possible we
decompose the costs of crime still further, splitting the criminals’
revenue from the costs they impose on others (which are often very
much larger).
Figure 1 shows our framework, and its cost categories are as
follows.
Criminal revenue is deﬁned as the gross receipts from crime. It
does not include the criminal’s ‘lawful’ business expenses, but we do
need to count criminal inputs, so as to get an accurate estimate of
the criminal-revenue contribution to GDP. For example, where
phishing is advertised by email spam sent by a botnet, we add the
criminal revenue of the phisherman (the money withdrawn from
victim accounts) and the amount he pays the spammer - possibly
split with the ‘owner’ of the botnet.
Direct loss is the value of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by
the victims as a consequence of a cybercrime. Examples include
money withdrawn from victim accounts; time and effort to reset account credentials after compromise (for both banks and consumers);
and lost attention and bandwidth caused by spam messages.
We do not try to measure distress directly; victims are not generally entitled to sue for it and it is hard to measure. Instead we try
to estimate the chilling effect that cybercrime - and the fear of
cybercrime - have on economic activity. This brings us to:
Indirect loss is the value of the losses and opportunity costs
imposed on society by the fact that a certain type of cybercrime is
carried out. Indirect costs generally cannot be attributed to individual perpetrators or victims. Examples include loss of trust in online
banking, leading to reduced revenues from transaction fees and
higher costs for maintaining branch staff; sales foregone by online
retailers when their fraud engines cause them to decline shopping
baskets; reduced uptake by citizens of electronic services whether
from companies or governments; cancelled operations due to online
© 2022 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2022
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medical services being unavailable; and efforts to clean up machines
infected with botnet malware.
Defence costs measure prevention efforts. They include security
products such as spam ﬁlters and antivirus; security services
provided to individuals, such as awareness raising; security services provided to industry, such as website ‘take-down’ services;
fraud detection and recovery efforts; law enforcement; and opportunity costs such as the inconvenience of missing messages
falsely classiﬁed as spam.
Like indirect losses, defence costs are largely independent of individual perpetrators and victims - and even of individual types of
cybercrime.
In our model, the total social cost of cybercrime is the sum of
direct losses, indirect losses, and defence costs. All our ﬁgures are
in nominal terms. We neglect inﬂation, as a 2012 dollar is worth
$1.11 in 2019 dollars, and the 11% difference is way below our error margin; interest rates have also been near-zero for most of this
period. Similarly, differences in exchange rates are insigniﬁcant.
We are not going to obsessively translate all amounts back and
forth between pounds, dollars, and Euros; with the accuracy with
which we can work here, these currencies might as well be
interchangeable.96

Figure 1
Framework for Analysing the Cost of a Cybercrime97
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Role for Cyber Insurance
For many years corporations and their boards have relied upon
insurance to mitigate risk.98 It is likely that cyber risk insurance
carriers have the best information models and experience
databases available. Professor Yogesh Malhotra writes, “Quantitative modeling of cyber risk for cyber insurance modeling is at a
nascent stage characterized by sparse empirical research and
reliable data.”99 Experience indicates the complex nature of this
task, and that “the modeler, the decision-maker, the regulator,
and, all others involved in developing, testing, managing, or using models need to ensure alignment of the models with the
reality. That is simpler said than done given . . . the reality in
the context of global cyberspace with increasing interactions is
itself dynamically changing.”100
Data Privacy
Chairman Gensler has recently observed that “customer and
client data privacy and personal information” were addressed by
Congress in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and that, “The
Commission adopted Regulation S-P in the wake of that law . . .
require[ing] registered broker-dealers, investment companies,
and investment advisers to protect customer records and
information.”101 Agreement should be reached about what data
privacy costs should be included in an enterprise’s computation of
cybersecurity expense. Should costs related to compliance with
the various new state privacy laws be included? For example,
under California’s CCPA, consumers can request that personal
information can be deleted . . . and so on.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Proposed Working Group Structure
We propose that the SEC establish a “Cybersecurity Disclosure
Study Commission” [working title] assigned with the task of
obtaining input regarding cyber-cost items that should properly
be included in these calculations and disclosures. The Commission may be constructed to provide input from identiﬁed stakeholders who are recognized opinion leaders among their various
constituencies (suggestions to be provided). Each sub-committee
will meet to discuss and formulate their thoughts for subsequent
distribution to all Commission members. Stakeholder input from
those parties who need detailed knowledge of their actual costs
should help mitigate loss resulting from even external “weakest
link” cyber exposure vulnerabilities. An initial (but incomplete)
list of potential commission members is presented below to foster
thought and discussion. Valuable input can be expected from the
following stakeholders:
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ABA and Securities Bar
Academics and Law Professors
Accounting Profession
AICPA
FASB
PCAOB
CAQ
Business Community
Corporate Directors
NACD leadership
Economists
Governmental Agencies and National Security Interests
[FBI]
Commerce Department [NIST]
Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)National Security Community [CIA, DHS, DOD, NSA, OTHERS]
Insurors of Cyber Risk
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Technology Community
Federal Advisory Act Considerations
We remain indebted to Professor John C. Coffee for bringing
our attention to consideration of the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).102 Professor Coffee recalls that he experienced
this issue several years ago when the Bharara Task Force on
Insider Trading was organized—- “and it may be easier not to
seek Commission approval or designation (and that body was
organized by an SEC Commissioner).”103 Professor Coffee adds
that this problem can be avoided by “having no Commission
member or sponsorship.”104
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
[W]hile [cyber criminals] have become more sophisticated, governments have been sluggish in responding in a meaningful way. As a
result, victims are often left to fend for themselves, turning to
specialty incident response ﬁrms that have developed a niche
industry for negotiating decryption. The costs of lost productivity,
disrupted operations, inefﬁciency in markets, and operational
recovery likely far outweigh the dollars siphoned out of the world’s
economies and dumped into illicit activities from human trafﬁcking
to the development of weapons of mass destruction. That’s right —
this malware has afforded Kim Jung Un’s ability to continue to
expand his nuclear arsenal. How is this still only viewed as a
cybercrime?
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Christopher C. Krebs
Congressional Testimony
May 5, 2021105
During recent years, many examples of nation state sponsored
cyber breaches, ransomware, and the use of U.S. domestic social
media by foreign interests to create political turmoil through the
promulgation of disinformation campaigns are reported.106 Accordingly, weaknesses in cyber defenses among the business community is a threat to national security interests and vice versa.
And, of course, the American population at large will suffer from
cyber defense weaknesses elsewhere. SEC Chair Gary Gensler
states, “The interconnectedness of our networks, the use of predictive data analytics, and the insatiable desire for data are only
accelerating.”107 As observed almost daily, “State actors and nonstate hackers alike sometimes try to target various entities and
businesses . . . To steal data, intellectual property, or money;
lower conﬁdence in our ﬁnancial system; disrupt economies; or
just demonstrate their capabilities. All this puts our ﬁnancial accounts, savings, and private information at risk.”108 Chairman
Gensler continues, “It’s not just the economic cost, of course.
Cybersecurity is central to national security. The events of the
past couple of weeks in Russia and Ukraine have once again
highlighted the importance of cybersecurity to our national
interest.”109 A recent example of the complex nature of the relationship between nation security interests, cybersecurity, and the
business community, is illustrated by Professor Charles Duan’s
observations that “the national security dimensions of ‘races’
against technological superpowers such as China, in ﬁelds such
as artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), ﬁfth-generation (5G) mobile communications networks, and quantum computing, has given rise to
a national dialogue on spurring domestic innovation, a dialogue
into which patents naturally ﬁt.”110
The Cost of War
Cyber-attacks have now become a cost-effective tool of war. For
example, during February 2022, The Wall Street Journal reports,
“Russia, which has positioned more than 100,000 troops around
three sides of Ukraine, is stepping up a destabilization campaign
involving cyber-attacks, economic disruption and a new tactic:
hundreds of fake bomb threats.”111 The direct costs of war including the ﬁnancing of troops, transportation, food and supplies—
plus lost revenues incurred by any country perceived under threat
of invasion due to lost tourist expenditures, lower economic
output resulting from uncertainty, and the like. In this case, The
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Wall Street Journal reports, “Russia is the world’s third-largest
oil producer, and if a conﬂict in Ukraine leads to a substantial
decrease in the ﬂow of Russian barrels to market, it would be
perilous for the tight balance between supply and demand.”112
Professors Chesney and Citron warn, “Public discourse on questions of policy currently suffers from the circulation of false
information.113 Sometimes lies are intended to undermine the
credibility of participants in such debates, and sometimes lies
erode the factual foundation that ought to inform policy
discourse.”114 Consider:
Even without prevalent deep fakes, information pathologies abound.
But deep fakes will exacerbate matters by raising the stakes for the
‘fake news’ phenomenon in dramatic fashion (quite literally). Many
actors will have sufﬁcient interest to exploit the capacity of deep
fakes to skew information and thus manipulate beliefs . . . Others
will do it simply as a tactic of intellectual vandalism and fraud . . .
In the absence of an agreed reality, efforts to solve national and
global problems become enmeshed in needless ﬁrst-order questions
like whether climate change is real. The large-scale erosion of public faith in data and statistics has led us to a point where the simple
introduction of empirical evidence can alienate those who have
come to view statistics as elitist. (internal citations omitted)115

The use of deep fake technologies to achieve a deceptive and
malicious altering of reality to deceive observers from the truth
may present destructive results in many sectors of life, including
sound and fair securities markets and the regulation thereof.
Professors Chesney and Citron warn:
Deep fakes will erode trust in a wide range of both public and
private institutions and such trust will become harder to maintain.
The list of public institutions for which this will matter runs the
gamut, including elected ofﬁcials, appointed ofﬁcials, judges, juries,
legislators, staffers, and agencies . . . Particularly where strong
narratives of distrust already exist, provocative deep fakes will ﬁnd
a primed audience.
Private sector institutions will be just as vulnerable. If an institution has a signiﬁcant voice or role in society, whether nationally or
locally, it is a potential target. More to the point, such institutions
already are subject to reputational attacks, but soon will have to
face abuse in the form of deep fakes that are harder to debunk and
more likely to circulate widely.116

A Seat at the Table
Your authors believe that inclusion of informed members of the
U.S. national security community is necessary to achieve the best
result from this project. All involved in the process of securing
domestic cyber infrastructure from nation-state and transnational
criminal elements should be represented in this dialogue. The
American business community is beneﬁted when any links, and
in particular the weakest links, in our mosaic of interconnected
data systems is strengthened.
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VI. PROPOSED PUBLIC COMPANY CYBERSECURITY
OVERSIGHT BOARD
We recommend the Commission should seriously consider asking Congress to pass legislation creating a Public Company
Cybersecurity Oversight Board for publicly-traded companies
similar to the PCAOB. 117 The PCAOB model is a nonproﬁt
corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of
brokers and dealers registered with the SEC and public
companies.118 Approval of the Board’s rules, standards, and budget
are governed by the SEC, with the ﬁve-member PCAOB Board
appointed to staggered ﬁve-year terms by the SEC, “after
consultation with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and Secretary of the Treasury.”119 In
PCAOB’s 2021 Annual Report they state “Advancements in
technology continue to affect the nature, timing, and preparation
of ﬁnancial information, including preparers’ controls around
ﬁnancial information, and the planning and performance of
audits.”120 Also during 2021, PCAOB’s “Ofﬁce of the Chief Auditor
devoted further attention to [a] research project on data and
technology, informed in part by input from a Data and Technology Taskforce, to assess whether there is a need for guidance,
changes to PCAOB standards, or other regulatory actions.”121 It
now appears to us that the area of cyber threat and risk management requires its own focus and resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
Corporations likely represent the weakest data entry point into
U.S. data infrastructure. Capturing structured cost data may allow management, boards, investors, regulators, and national security policy makers to better understand the true costs incurred
in cyber defense and breach mediation. Externality costs associated with cyberattack, when ignored by industry, are placing additional burdens upon government and other institutions (such
as municipalities, school systems and universities) and citizens
when their customer identity data is stolen, resulting in fraud
committed against them. Regulators, management, directors, and
investors need meaningful and comparable structured data to facilitate decisions about this critically important issue. We believe
this proposal is of signiﬁcant importance and represents a timely
contribution in fostering better cooperation between all interested
stakeholders in cyber hygiene and security.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1
Three channels through which ﬁnancial accounting information
may affect economic performance [observing] Governance role of
ﬁnancial accounting information operates through channel 21
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Figure 2
Predicted interactions between ﬁnancial accounting regimes and
other factors in affecting economic performance2

NOTES:
1
Prepared Remarks Before the Principles for Responsible Investment
“Climate and Global Financial Markets” Webinar (Jul. 28, 2021), https://www.se
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